My research focuses on decision making in Principal–Agent interactions. Principal–Agent interactions are ubiquitous, but enforceable, complete contracts between them are not. It is natural to ask how the strategic environment in which the Principal and Agent interact can be structured so that they reach efficient outcomes even in the absence of a complete contract. This theme cross-cuts areas within economics, psychology, and the cognitive and decision sciences. I also think this research bears in significant ways on socially important issues like gender inequity in wages and compensation, how women are perceived and how they perceive themselves in bargaining and negotiation environments.

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Working Papers

An Experimental Investigation into Gender Differences in Wage Negotiations
-Management Science, Revise and Resubmit

The Role of Expectations and Gender in Altruism
-with Adam Seth Levine
-Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Revise and Resubmit

Sabotaging Another: Priming Competition Increases Cheating Behavior in Tournaments
(Rigdon and D’Esterre)

Competition Increases Cooperation in Repeated Networked Exchange
– with Alessandra Cassar

Plausible Deniability and Cooperation in Trust Games
-with Anthony Gillies
-invited submission, Review of Behavioral Economics