



COLLEGE OF SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Political Economy  
& Moral Science



Center for the Philosophy  
of Freedom

 University of San Diego®



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## 2024 PPEL Summer School – Faculty and Lectures

**[Suzi Dovi](#), Professor, School of Government & Public Policy, University of Arizona**

Suzanne Dovi is a Professor of the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona. Her research interests include democratic theory, representation (especially the representation of historically disadvantaged groups), feminist theory and human rights. She is most interested in exploring how democratic citizens should evaluate those who hold and exercise power over vulnerable and marginalized groups. Dovi earned her Ph.d from Princeton University but she also has a MA from Georgetown University and a M. Litt. from Trinity College, Dublin. Her work has appeared in *American Political Science Review*, *Journal of Politics*, *Political Theory*, *Gender & Politics*, *Contemporary Political Theory*, *Constellations*, and *Polity*. Her book, *The Good Representative*, was published by Blackwell in 2008 and was the subject of a special issue in *PS: Political Science & Politics*. She is currently working on another book project about how representation can have undemocratic and inequalitarian effects. This book is entitled *Toxic Representation*.

### “Schadenfreude Representation”

The United States is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of negative partisanship as well as particularly virulent forms of partisanship. For instance, “the vast majority of Republicans and Democrats strongly preferred their own party’s nominee because they intensely disliked the opposing party’s nominee” in the 2016 US presidential election (Saad 2016a). Voters do not pick candidates whom they positively value for their leadership traits or qualifications; rather, they employ a “lesser evil” calculus while voting. Based on recent empirical data on negative partisanship, I identify a political phenomenon that I call “Schadenfreude Representation.”

Schadenfreude representation occurs when a group X gains pleasure and feels represented when a representative makes an out-group Y worse off. Put simply, by encouraging representation that makes others worse off, Schadenfreude representation transforms the incentives of democratic governance. Constituencies care less about how their pocketbooks are doing and more about how an out-group is doing comparatively. Instead of aggregating preferences so that a majority gets what they want and are allegedly qualitatively better off substantively, Schadenfreude representation aggregates preferences so that it is feasible that the majority is worse off. To be sure, citizens can experience and understand their interests as being better because their opponents are doing worst off, but that way understanding interests is not democratically desirable. In particular I argue in this paper that schadenfreude representation undermines the institutional incentives that produce democratic legitimacy.

**[Anthony Gillies](#), Sherwin Scott Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona**

Anthony (Thony) Gillies is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. His present work examines how rational(ish) but imperfectly informed agents like us communicate about and operate

in an unpredictable world like ours full of other agents. This cross-cuts topics in formal semantics, philosophical logic, formal epistemology, and various parts of the decision sciences.

Prior to returning to Arizona, Thony was a member of the philosophy department at Rutgers for 11 years and has held appointments at the University of Michigan, Harvard University, and the University of Texas at Austin.

#### “Puzzles in Decision Theory”

An introduction to some active debates in decision theory that PPEL students might not see in their coursework.

### **[Saura Masconale](#), Assistant Professor, Department of Political Economy & Moral Science, Associate Director, Center for the Philosophy of Freedom, University of Arizona**

Saura Masconale is Associate Director at the University of Arizona Center for the Philosophy of Freedom and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Economy & Moral Science. At the Freedom Center, she is also in charge of the Master of Legal Studies, Law & Economics concentration, which the Center cosponsors with the James E. Rogers College of Law. Saura was also competitively selected for the University of Arizona Academic Leadership Institute in 2021-22.

Her research encompasses the broad domain of “law and political economy,” which studies how the intersection of legal entitlements, politics, and economic forces affect society, both as a positive and normative matter. In particular, her scholarship to date has focused on exploring the implications of this intersection in the public corporation context. Saura’s articles have appeared in the *Northwestern Law Review*, the *Texas Law Review*, the *Washington University Law Review*, the *Journal of Corporate Law*, and *Social Philosophy and Policy*, among other outlets. Her most recent work examines the evolution of the corporation from a mere economic agent to a new political actor and explores the democratic and political implications of this transformation.

Saura holds a doctoral degree in law and economics from LUISS Guido Carli University (Rome) and a J.D. from University of Bologna. Prior to joining the Freedom Center, she taught at the University of Chicago Law School and the University of Notre Dame Law School. Before entering into academia, she practiced law at Clifford Chance LLC, an international law firm headquartered in London.

#### “Economic Autonomy and Market Activism”

Individuals have *economic autonomy*. This is our capacity, within the general domain of autonomy, to make unencumbered economic decisions for our lives, including by choosing what products or services to purchase or not to purchase. But are individuals morally permitted to engage in *market activism*, using their private purchasing power to pursue social changes? An initially reasonable argument for an unrestricted permission to engage in market activism rests on the promotion of substantive justice. On this view, individuals would be authorized to leverage their private purchasing power when this helps prevent or halt activities that they judge detrimental to the common good. For example, individuals could decide to support, or instead stop to buy, a product or service to pressure companies to lower carbon footprints or improve board diversity. This view, however, is open to a serious criticism. Due to its social objective, the exercise of private purchasing power in these and similar examples would take on a “political” character. Consequently, it should be subject to broader democratic principles, reflecting our collective commitment to adjudicating normatively significant outcomes via democratic processes rather than market processes.

The goal of this article is to defend a permissive view of market activism to the extent it constitutes a response to market problems. Put more simply, *under certain conditions*, market activism is an effective way to address market failures. Outside of these conditions, activism may raise substantial issues of procedural justice, including the risk of various forms of vigilantism. However, prohibiting market activism altogether or subjecting it to strict democratic constraints raises the much more severe risk of impairing an individual's economic autonomy as well as the ability of markets to serve their allocative function.

**Dierdre McCloskey, Distinguished Professor Emerita of Economics and of History;  
Professor Emerita of English and of Communication, University of Illinois at Chicago**

Deirdre McCloskey is Distinguished Professor Emerita of Economics and of History, and Professor Emerita of English and of Communication, at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Trained at Harvard in the 1960s as an economist, she has written twenty books and some four hundred academic articles on economic theory, economic history, philosophy, rhetoric, statistical theory, feminism, ethics, and law. She taught for twelve years in Economics at the University of Chicago, and describes herself now as a “postmodern free-market quantitative Episcopalian feminist Aristotelian.”

Her scientific work has been on economic history, especially British. Her recent book *Bourgeois Equality* is a study of Dutch and British economic and social history. She has written on British economic "failure" in the 19th century, trade and growth in the 19th century, open field agriculture in the middle ages, the Gold Standard, and the Industrial Revolution.

Her philosophical books include *The Rhetoric of Economics* (University of Wisconsin Press 1st ed. 1985; 2nd ed. 1998), *If You're So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise* (University of Chicago Press 1990), and *Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics* (Cambridge 1994). They concern the maladies of social scientific positivism, the epistemological limits of a future social science, and the promise of a rhetorically sophisticated philosophy of science. In her later work she has turned to ethics and to a philosophical-historical apology for modern economies.

**Mary Rigdon, Director, Center for the Philosophy of Freedom, University of Arizona and  
Associate Professor, Department of Political Economy & Moral Science**

Director of the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Economy and Moral Science at the University of Arizona, is a nationally recognized expert on gender equity. Her recent work focuses on understanding gender differences in competitiveness and the role this plays in the persistent gender wage gap. Her research reveals that women are just as competitive as men but are motivated differently, influenced by evolutionary and cultural constraints. This work underscores the importance of recognizing and addressing the systemic barriers that hinder gender equality in the workplace. Mary's work is supported by the National Science Foundation, has been published in top scientific journals and covered by local, national, and international media, including interviews with UArizona News, a special feature in the Financial Post, KJZZ's The Show (Phx, AZ), and KVOA Channel 4 News (Tucson, AZ). Mary has presented this research in the National Science Foundation's Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences Distinguished Lecture Series, to the Arizona Department of Economic Security team, at the Arizona Council of Economic Education Invest in Girls launch, and she was competitively selected to present her research at the 2023 SXSW UArizona Wonder House.

### “Market Exchange”

Vernon Smith, 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economics, is considered the founder of experimental economics. One of his most famous experiments is the double auction market, where buyers and sellers trade in a simulated market environment. Through these experiments, Smith demonstrated several key findings, such as the convergence of prices to equilibrium levels, the importance of bid-ask spreads in market efficiency, and the role of information asymmetry in shaping market outcomes. Overall, Smith's experiments have provided valuable insights into market dynamics and behavior, shedding light on how markets function under various conditions. Students will participate in an double-oral-auction to learn about supply and demand and discover for themselves the power of market exchange.

### **Simone Sepe, Chester H. Smith Professor, and Professor of Law and Finance, University of Arizona**

Sepe's areas of expertise include business organizations, corporate finance, contract theory, law and economics, law and philosophy, and empirical methods. His main scholarship focuses on theoretical and empirical problems related to corporate governance, although he has recently expanded his research interest to contract law, the theory of institutions, and political philosophy. He holds doctoral degrees in both law and economics. Professor Sepe practiced banking and finance law at Clifford Chance, an international law firm based in London, and worked as an investment banker at Fortress Investment Group in London and New York.

### “Should Corporations Be Democracies or Republics?”

Poison pills are among the most powerful anti-takeover defenses, which makes the governance of corporations resemble a strong republic, with most of the real authority in the hands of the board. Studying the economic impact of poison pills is challenging because even firms without a “visible” pill have a “shadow” pill – that is, the right to adopt a poison pill at any moment. I examine the impact of “shadow pills” by exploiting the staggered adoption of poison pill laws (PPLs) across U.S. states, which strengthened the “shadow pill.” I document that PPLs align the policy on visible pills more closely with economic incentives, leading to increased pill adoption among low-valuation firms but decreased adoption among high-valuation firms. PPLs have a positive impact on firm value, especially for innovative firms with more intangible assets. These results suggest that corporations should not resemble democracies.

### **Candace Smith, Etiquette Educator and Coach**

Smith received a Bachelor of Arts in English, Speech Communication, and History and a Master of Arts in Economics Education. After her husband was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2002 she was immersed in formal social gatherings and travel that sparked her desire to know appropriate social graces that would put her at ease in social situations. She attended etiquette and protocol certification classes, and these kicked off a deep immersion into the study of the importance of etiquette and its practical application to many of the problems of life. Smith started *Etiquette for the Business of Life* in 2012 to engage individuals and groups in hands-on learning to gain practical skills in etiquette and protocol and communication for all aspects of “the business of life.”

**Vlad Tarko, Associate Professor & Department Head, Department of Political Economy & Moral Science, University of Arizona**

Tarko's main research interests are public choice, institutional economics, and varieties of capitalism. His papers, books and conference presentations currently fall mainly in two larger research projects: (1) The political economy and institutional theory of polycentric governance. (2) The performance of alternative capitalist systems and the problem of economic disequilibrium. In the first category, Tarko is the co-author of one of the most widely cited papers on the history and definition of "polycentricity", and he has several other papers that apply the concept to specific topics: democracy as co-production of rules, the institutions of the scientific community, ecological resilience, the resilience of the banking sector, the stability of the financial system, and federalism under highly imperfect Tiebout competition. In the second category, Tarko has authored and co-authored several papers and a book on applying the rent-seeking model to understand different types of capitalism, methodology papers on how to use statistical methods to build taxonomies of economic systems and evaluate the consequences of constitutions, and theory papers on entrepreneurship, economic disequilibrium, the capacity for collective learning under alternative institutions, and the role of ideas in driving institutional changes.

**"The Politics of Public Finance and Public Debt"**

This talk will present a framework for thinking about why we tend to have inefficiently high levels of public debt. The framework rests on the analysis of the partial overlaps between three groups: (i) government bond holders (who finance the public debt), (ii) present-day recipients of public services partially paid with public debt, (iii) future taxpayers who pay back the public debt. There are several biases toward over-borrowing: (a) fiscal commons problem, (b) rent-seeking by bond holders, (c) intergenerational justice problem, (d) fiscal illusion, and (e) Samaritan's dilemma.

**John Thrasher, Associate Professor, Philosophy Department, Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy, Chapman University**

John Thrasher is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department as well as the Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy at Chapman University in Orange County, California. He is also an Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at Monash University. From 2014-2018, Thrasher was a Lecturer (Assistant Professor with tenure) in Philosophy at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. He is also the Director of the Law & Liberal Arts Minor at Chapman University.

Thrasher specializes in political philosophy, normative ethics, and decision/game theory and its applications to ethics and political philosophy. His research focuses on the relation of individual practical rationality to social rules as well as the way those rules are organized into systems of norms and institutions. He is especially interested in how recent work in moral psychology and experimental economics can inform our understanding of how to improve our institutions of self-governance.

**"Putting Capitalism in its Place"**

Everyone hates capitalism, or so it seems. This is despite the fact that there is little agreement on what, exactly, "capitalism" is. Critics often attribute various negative aspects of modern society to capitalism; however, these criticisms may not be exclusive to capitalist systems. To properly evaluate capitalism, we need to compare it to its alternatives. To distinguish capitalism from the status quo—as well as from alternatives—we need a clear conception of what capitalism is. Thinking



clearly about capitalism, then, is important if we want to make crucial normative evaluations within and between capitalist (and non-capitalist) societies.

**Bas Van der Vossen, Professor, Philosophy Department, Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy, Chapman University**

Bas Van der Vossen is a Professor in the Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy, as well as the Philosophy Department at Chapman University. He is the founder and director of Chapman's Law and the Liberal Arts minor. His research focuses on questions of political philosophy, primarily of political economy, global justice, and the Lockean theory of property rights. He also writes about the ethics of political activism in the academy.

His books include *In Defense of Openness: Why Global Freedom Is the Humane Solution to Global Poverty* (Oxford University Press, 2018), with Jason Brennan, and *Debating Humanitarian Intervention: Should We Try to Save Strangers?* (Oxford University Press, 2017), with Fernando Tesón. He is also an Associate Editor of *Politics, Philosophy and Economics* and *Social Philosophy and Policy*.

**"Immigration and Global Justice"**

Global justice is about what we owe to people around the world. The most pressing question in global justice concerns migration. Should people be free to move to different countries? Or can governments decide to keep them out? And why? We will discuss how we should think about this question and I'll propose a rough answer to the question of how we should treat immigration as a society.

**Steven Wall, Professor, Philosophy Department, University of Arizona**

Steve Wall is a philosopher at the University of Arizona, where he is also a member of the Center for the Philosophy of Freedom and a member of the Politics, Philosophy, Economics and Law Program. Prior to joining the Arizona department in 2010, he taught at the University of Connecticut, Bowling Green State University and Kansas State University. He received his B.A. from Duke University, his M.A. from Columbia University and his D. Phil. from Oxford University. He specializes in political philosophy. With David Sobel and Peter Vallentyne, he edits *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy*.

**"The Rule of Law and its Virtue"**

The rule of law is one of the most celebrated ideals in modern jurisprudence, but it is often misunderstood and its normative significance is often not adequately appreciated. The rule of law is an ideal, and must be distinguished from rule by law. Put otherwise, not every system of law realizes the ideal of the rule of law. This lecture presents an account of the rule of law, one that draws in different ways on the work of H.L.A. Hart, Lon Fuller and Frederick Hayek. It argues that the rule of law is a positive ideal, and not merely a negative virtue, as many influential writers have suggested. The rule of law, the lecture contends, is a key part of a planning-friendly social environment, which facilitates the freedom and self-determination of individuals. But while the rule of law is a positive ideal, it is but one ideal among many, and its realization is consistent with substantial injustice and the violation of basic individual rights. By not packing too much substantive content into the rule of law, the lecture concludes, we can best appreciate the distinctive and important contribution it makes to well-ordered legal systems in the modern world.

**Bart Wilson, Professor of Economics and Law, Donald P. Kennedy Endowed Chair of Economics and Law, Chapman University**

Bart Wilson is a Professor of Economics and Law and the Donald P. Kennedy Endowed Chair in Economics and Law at Chapman University. He is a member of the Economic Science Institute and tenured in the Argyros School of Business and Economics and the Fowler School of Law. In Fall 2016, he co-founded the Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy, for which he serves as the director.

Bart has published papers widely in economics and general science journals, including the *American Economic Review*, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *Scientific Reports*, and *Nature Human Behaviour*. His research has been supported with grants from the National Science Foundation, the Federal Trade Commission, and the International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics. Bart's undergraduate teaching supports the Humanomics minor at upper division level and Chapman's First-Year Foundations Course at the lower division. He also teaches a seminar for law school students on spontaneous order and the law.

Prior to joining the faculty at Chapman, he was an Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University and before that a Research Scientist at the Economic Science Laboratory at the University of Arizona. He started his professional career as an Economist at the Federal Trade Commission. Bart received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Arizona and his B.S. in Economics and Mathematics from the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire.

**“The Property Species”**

What is property? And why do human beings happen to have it? Following Harold Demsetz, economists argue that unrealized gains or the avoidance of losses explain the emergence of property rights in land among Native Americans on the Labrador peninsula. Such an analytical framework, however, makes consequences the origin of our actions. I propose an account of property that distinguishes the causes of our actions from the consequences of our actions.

**Matt Zwolinski, Professor, Philosophy Department, University of San Diego**

Matt Zwolinski is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of San Diego, founder and director of USD's Center for Ethics, Economics, and Public Policy, and director of USD's undergraduate program in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. He writes about the basic income guarantee, exploitation, and the history of libertarian ideas.

Zwolinski's research interests are generally in the intersection of ethics, law, and economics, with two specific areas of focus. The first involves the proper understanding and normative status of liberty and political libertarianism. Lately, he has been especially interested in libertarian approaches to defending a Basic Income Guarantee. The second area of interest has to do with the nature and moral significance of exploitation for individual ethics and political institutions.

**“The Pros and Cons of a Universal Basic Income”**

The motivating idea of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) is radically simple: give people cash and let them do whatever they want with it. But does this simple idea have the potential to radically transform our society? From Finland to Kenya to Stockton, California, more and more governments and private philanthropic organizations are putting the idea of a Universal Basic Income to the test. What do these experiments show about the viability of a UBI? Is a UBI a sound policy to deal with

## 2024 PPEL Undergraduate Summer School Schedule

	Mon June 3	Tues June 4	Wed June 5	Thurs June 6	Fri June 7
8:15-9:00		breakfast	breakfast	breakfast	breakfast
9:00-10:15		Welcome and Intro to the BQ project	Plenary: <b>Deirdre McCloskey</b>	<b>Matt Zwolinski:</b> Pros/Cons UBI	<b>Bas Van der Vossen:</b> Immigration and Global Justice
10:15-10:45		coffee	coffee	coffee	coffee
10:45-12:00		<b>Suzanne Dovi:</b> Schadenfreude Representation	<b>Bart Wilson:</b> The Property Species	<b>John Thrasher:</b> Putting Capitalism in its Place	Students: Present Your BQ Project
12:00-1:30		lunch (campus dining)	lunch (campus dining)	lunch (campus dining)	working lunch (BQ feedback)
1:30-2:45		<b>Saura Masconale:</b> Economic Autonomy and Market Activism	<b>Vlad Tarko:</b> The Politics of Public Finance and Public Debt	<b>Simone Sepe:</b> Should Corporations Be Democracies or Republics?	Students: Present Your BQ Project
3:00-4:15	check in to dorms	<b>Mary Rigdon:</b> Market Exchange (experiment)	<b>Thony Gillies:</b> Puzzles in Decision Theory	<b>Steve Wall:</b> The Rule of Law and Its Virtue	feedback + wrap up
4:30-5:15	check in to dorms	<b>Candace Smith:</b> Socializing at Professional Networking	Time for BQ Project (faculty: Tarko, Wilson, Gillies)	Time for BQ Project (faculty: Thrasher, Wall, Zwolinski)	
5:30-7:00	dinner avail in dining hall	dinner avail in dining hall	group dinner on campus	dinner avail in dining hall	



## The Big Question Project

One goal with the PPEL Summer School is to help students to identify their own Big Question. To this end we will assign a “Big Question Project” at the very beginning of the summer school and have students present their Big Questions on the last day. You can work in small groups of up to 4 people.

Big Ideas are first of all about Big Questions. What is the Big Question we need to ask that we have not asked yet? In the PPEL Summer School you will be exposed to new topics and methodologies in a vast array of scholarly areas, from economics to philosophy to law. This exposure should make you more curious and leave you wanting to know more. It should make you eager to pursue a Big Question.

The goal of this project is NOT to come up with answers but just ONE question that will add value to the world. Hopefully, you will have a lifetime – or at least years of graduate school – to go after that question and come up with answers that may help you and others fully realize that value.

We expect you to talk to your colleagues after class about your Big Question (maybe at the beach!). For Big Questions and Big Ideas are often the result of a team effort. So if some of you decide to pursue the Big Question Project together that will be fine too (groups up to 4 people).

And remember going after Big Questions should be fun! In order to successively pursue the Big Question Project, you will need to deliberate and plan, think about fundamental principles like freedom and responsibility, but also issues like cost-benefit analysis and how to commensurate the value of your Big Question-Idea or issues about the ethics of allocating resources to one Big Question, and more.

Students without prior PPE/L training focus their questions in areas covered by the Summer School’s lectures. This approach will provide a starting point for less experienced students, both in terms of content and guidance from the Summer School faculty (who will act as quasi-advisors).

Additionally, there are preliminary readings for you before the start of the Summer School, ensuring that you are able to attend the lectures with a foundation of relevant basic knowledge. They are not required, but suggested readings.

\$1000 will be awarded to the person/team selected as first, \$500 will be awarded to the person/team selected as second and \$250 will be awarded to the person/team selected as third.